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W
hile there is widespread agreement that
banks play a key part in the transmission
of monetary policy actions to the econ-
omy, there is considerable controversy over the
precise role that banks play. The focus of this debate
is whether bank lending plays a special part in the
monetary transmission mechanism. If a special
lending or credit channel exists, changes in the
willingness and ability of banks to extend credit
may have implications for aggregate economic
activity. Moreover, ongoing changes in the role
banks play in financial markets may affect this
credit channel and so alter the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.
Recent research on a bank credit channel has
focused on two questions. Are certain borrowers so
dependent on bank lending that any change in
banks’ willingness to lend immediately affects in-
vestment and spending decisions? And, do mone-
tary policy changes directly constrain bank
lending? Both conditions are necessary for bank
lending to play a special role in the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. Thus far, research on a credit
channel has yielded mixed results. Some recent
research provides support for the view that certain
borrowers, such as small businesses, are very de-
pendent on banks for financing. This finding sug-
gests that disruptions in bank credit could affect
economic activity. At the same time, there is con-
flicting evidence that bank lending is directly con-
strained by monetary policy actions. 
This article provides additional insight into the
second question—whether bank lending is con-
strained by monetary policy. The article does so by
analyzing how banks adjust the amount and terms
of business lending when monetary policy is
tightened. The analysis differs from previous re-
search by using a more precise measure of monetary
policy actions, which allows a more accurate iden-
tification of episodes of monetary tightening. Evi-
dence presented in the article suggests that bank
business lending is not constrained by restrictive
monetary policy. The article concludes that mone-
tary policy does not appear to operate through a
special credit channel. 
The first section of the article examines the
rationale for a credit channel and the implications
of this channel for monetary policy. The second
section reviews recent research on the key features
of a credit channel: bank dependent borrowers and
the ability of monetary policy to directly restrict
bank lending. The final section presents new em-
pirical evidence on whether monetary policy con-
strains bank business lending. 
Charles S. Morris and Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. are assistant
vice presidents and economists at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City. Stacy Bear and Corey Koenig, research
associates at the bank, and Ken Heinecke, a former research
associate at the bank, helped prepare the article.BANK LENDING AND THE MONETARY
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
The view that bank lending plays a special role
in monetary policy has been part of policy debates
for over 40 years. The existence of a lending or
credit channel implies that ongoing structural
changes in the banking industry may alter the mone-
tary transmission mechanism and make it harder to
implement monetary policy.
The special nature of bank lending
There is general agreement among econo-
mists and policymakers that monetary policy
works mainly through interest rates. When policy
is tightened through a decrease in reserve provision,
for example, interest rates rise. A rise in interest
rates leads to a reduction in spending by interest-
sensitive sectors of the economy, such as housing
and consumer purchases of durable goods. Banks
play a part in this interest rate mechanism since a
reduction in the money supply—which consists
mainly of deposit liabilities of banks—is one of the
principal factors pushing up interest rates. In this
standard view of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism, however, there is nothing unique about bank
lending. Indeed, the interest rate mechanism does
not depend on what assets banks hold; the same
response would occur regardless of the proportions
of a bank’s assets that are held as loans or securities
(Bernanke and Blinder 1988).
In contrast to this description of the transmis-
sion mechanism, some economists and policymak-
ers have argued that an additional policy channel
works through bank credit. In this view, monetary
policy directly constrains the ability of banks to
make new loans, making credit less available to
borrowers who are dependent on bank financing.
Thus, in the credit channel, restrictive monetary
policy works not only by raising interest rates, but
also by directly restricting bank credit.
The view that bank lending plays a special role
in the transmission mechanism is not a new idea.
Indeed, it has been part of monetary policy debates
for over 40 years. During the 1950s, for example,
proponents of the “availability doctrine” argued that
a bank credit channel provided the Federal Reserve
with additional leverage in conducting monetary
policy.
1 According to this view, the existence of a
direct channel from monetary policy to bank lend-
ing made it possible to carry out monetary policy
without large changes in interest rates. Restrictive
monetary policy would cause banks to directly re-
duce the supply of loans, forcing businesses to cut
back their spending.
In recent years, debate over the existence of
a bank credit channel has focused on two distinct
but related lines of research. One approach exam-
ined whether banks ration credit to borrowers
(Jaffee; Keeton; Stiglitz and Weiss). To the extent
that “credit rationing” exists, it may provide a direct
channel for monetary policy. More recently, a
second line of research termed the “credit view,” or
“lending view,” has explored how credit market
imperfections may not only create a credit channel
for monetary policy, but also may make disrup-
tions in credit availability a source of fluctuations
in economic activity (Bernanke and Blinder 1988).
As in the availability doctrine, this approach em-
phasizes that changes in monetary policy may
work partly by directly affecting the supply of
bank loans.
Bank credit and monetary policy 
If bank lending plays a central role in the
monetary transmission mechanism, changes in
bank lending practices or in the role that banks
play in financial markets can alter the transmission
mechanism and have important policy implications.
Two institutional changes that may have affected
the transmission mechanism are the secular decline
in bank lending to business and the growing use of
bank loan commitments.
Banks have traditionally been a primary source
60 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYof short-term credit for business. Businesses bor-
row from banks to finance inventories and working
capital, to obtain short-term construction and land-
development loans, and to provide bridge financing
for mergers and acquisitions. Over time, however,
business dependence on bank loans has diminished
as alternatives such as the commercial paper market
and nonbank intermediaries have allowed busi-
nesses to bypass banks. Thus, the proportion of
short-term business finance provided by banks has
dropped dramatically over the past 20 years (Chart
1). Where businesses obtained 80 percent of their
short-term funding from banks in the early 1970s,
they currently get only 50 percent from banks. In
contrast, reliance on the commercial paper market
and finance companies has increased.
The decline in bank lending to businesses sug-
gests that if a credit channel exists, its importance
may have changed over time. If so, the monetary
transmission mechanism also may have changed,
with less of the impact of policy occurring through
bank lending and more occurring through interest
rates. Such a change could complicate monetary
policy. Without an accurate measure of the impact
of these changes, for example, the Federal Reserve
could underestimate the change in interest rates
needed to achieve a slowing in economic activity,
resulting in an inflationary bias to policy.
2 
A second institutional change in banking with
policy implications is the growing use of loan com-
mitments. A loan commitment is an agreement be-
tween a borrower and lender that allows the
50






Note: Bank loans are the sum of the categories “bank loans not elsewhere classified” and “acceptance liabilities to banks” as
a percentage of short-term business credit to nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business.
Source: Authors’ calculations are from Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.






ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 61borrower to draw down a line of credit at his discre-
tion. In effect, a loan commitment provides guaran-
teed funding up to a credit limit, protecting the
borrower from being denied credit. Over the past
two decades, the use of bank loan commitments has
increased dramatically (Chart 2). In the late 1970s,
only 20 percent of bank loans to business were made
under the terms of a commitment. In recent years,
however, 75 percent of all bank loans to business
have been made under commitment.
The growing use of commitments also has im-
plications for the transmission mechanism. If a
credit channel exists, the increased use of loan
commitments may tend to lengthen monetary pol-
icy lags because firms can borrow under a commit-
ment and delay the impact of a policy tightening.
This introduces an additional complication to the
implementation of monetary policy. Without an
accurate estimate of the effect of loan commitments
on the transmission mechanism, the Federal Re-
serve may have difficulty judging the timing of
policy actions. 
RECENT RESEARCH ON A CREDIT
CHANNEL
Recent research on whether a credit channel
plays an important part in the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism has focused on two issues: whether
certain borrowers are dependent on bank loans and
whether bank lending is constrained by monetary
20






Note: Percent of the total number of loans made that are made under commitment.  Loans are loans with maturity between one
month and one year plus demand loans.
Source: Authors’ calculations are from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.






62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpolicy. While there is some evidence that small
firms may be especially dependent on banks for
financing, there are conflicting opinions on whether
bank lending is directly affected by monetary policy
actions.
Are borrowers dependent on banks?
The view that some borrowers are dependent
on banks for financing stems from economic mod-
els of asymmetric information that help explain
credit market imperfections. The central idea is that
the costs of obtaining information about a firm’s
condition, as well as liquidation or bankruptcy
costs, are differentially greater for smaller firms.
Thus, small firms find it more difficult and more
costly to obtain credit. In addition, a special feature
of banks is that they may have a comparative ad-
vantage over other intermediaries in information
processing and monitoring that enables banks to
lend to smaller firms at lower cost.
3
These theories provide a rationale for observed
differences in large-firm and small-firm financing.
Generally speaking, larger firms have a greater
array of financing options, including equity, long-
term debt, and short-term debt, in addition to bank
loans and internal cash flow. In contrast, smaller
firms appear to have much less access to capital
markets and depend more on bank loans, trade
credit, and internal funds for financing. The greater
dependence of smaller firms on bank financing, in
turn, suggests they may be more vulnerable than
larger firms to disruptions in credit availability.
A number of studies have provided evidence
that these credit market imperfections may explain
differences in behavior of small and large firms
during periods of tight credit. For example, small
firms appear to account for a larger share of the
decline in manufacturing activity and reduced in-
ventory demand that follow a monetary tightening
(Gertler and Gilchrist 1994). Similarly, small firms
appear to have less access to bank and nonbank
external finance in periods of monetary tightening
(Oliner and Rudebusch). This behavior is consistent
with the view that restrictions in the availability of
bank credit could have macroeconomic conse-
quences by affecting the investment and spending
decisions of bank-dependent borrowers. 
Does monetary policy constrain bank
lending?
For monetary policy to operate through a credit
channel, not only must there be bank dependent
borrowers, but monetary policy must also directly
affect banks’ willingness to lend. To determine
whether monetary policy affects bank lending,
some studies have examined how banks adjust their
portfolios in periods of monetary tightening, while
other studies have looked at changes in the price and
nonprice terms of lending.
Bank portfolio behavior. One approach to iden-
tifying a bank lending channel is to see how banks
alter their assets and liabilities during periods of
monetary restraint. Accordingly, a number of stud-
ies have examined how banks adjust loans, securi-
ties, and deposit and nondeposit liabilities to
changes in monetary policy. Several stylized facts
about bank portfolio behavior have emerged from
this line of research (Bernanke and Blinder 1992;
Romer and Romer 1990). First, in response to a
tightening of policy, bank transactions deposits or
core deposits fall immediately. Second, total bank
loans decline, but only after a significant lag of two
to three quarters. Third, banks are able to maintain
lending in the face of a decline in core deposits by
selling securities and by issuing managed liabilities
such as time deposits and Eurodollar borrowings.
Fourth, the eventual decline in bank lending is
roughly contemporaneous with a decline in eco-
nomic activity as measured by industrial production
or GDP.
Taken as a whole, these results do not resolve
the debate over the existence of a credit channel.
While there is some evidence that bank lending
declines when policy is tightened, the time lags
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 63appear quite long. Moreover, although the contem-
poraneous decline in loans and output is consistent
with a reduction in lending causing output to fall, it
is equally consistent with a decline in output caus-
ing a fall in loan demand.
An additional problem with many of these stud-
ies is that they use total bank loans, which includes
consumer and real estate lending, rather than busi-
ness loans. Based on the discussion of credit market
imperfections above, business lending would ap-
pear to be the more appropriate measure in testing
for a credit channel. Indeed, given the large number
of nonbank credit sources for consumer and real
estate lending and the extensive securitization of
these loans, it is difficult to believe the informa-
tional problems that make small businesses depend-
ent on bank credit would apply to other types of
lending. 
Unfortunately, focusing on business lending
still does not resolve the debate. One recent study
that specifically looks at how bank business lending
responds to policy tightening finds business lending
does not decline when policy is tightened (Gertler
and Gilchrist 1993). All of the decline in total
lending comes from a reduction in consumer and
real estate loans. Moreover, when the analysis is
narrowed further to loans to manufacturing firms,
bank lending actually shows a significant increase
in response to tighter policy. Indeed, for manufac-
turing firms, most of the increased lending appears
to go to large firms; while loans to small manu-
facturing firms are largely unaffected by policy
0






Source: Authors’ calculations; Sellon (1994).





64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYtightening. Thus, there is little evidence banks ac-
tually reduce lending to small firms when monetary
policy is tightened.
In contrast to this study, Kashyap and Stein find
evidence that business lending may respond to a
tightening of monetary policy. They examine the
lending behavior of small and large banks, rather
than loans received by small and large firms.
Kashyap and Stein find that when policy is tight-
ened, both total loans and business loans at small
banks fall, while loans at large banks are unaffected.
The differential response of small banks may
indicate they have less access to alternative funding
sources than large banks and so are less able to avoid
the loss of core deposits when policy is tightened.
Since small banks lend primarily to smaller firms,
this research is consistent with the view that
monetary policy may work, in part, through a credit
channel.
Another line of research consistent with
Kashyap and Stein examines the behavior of busi-
ness loans not made under terms of a loan commit-
ment (Sofianos, Wachtel, and Melnik; Morgan).
These loans would appear to be most vulnerable to
monetary tightening. This line of research provides
evidence that uncommitted loans fall in periods of
monetary tightening, while loans made under the
terms of an existing commitment are unaffected.
Thus, restrictive policy may work primarily by
reducing the availability of bank credit to business
borrowers without a loan commitment.
Terms of bank lending. Given these conflicting
 80
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Note: Business loans are commercial and industrial loans deflated by the consumer price index excluding food and energy.
Source: Business loans are from the H.8 release, and industrial production is from the G.17 release.  Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.






















ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 65results, most researchers agree that analyses of ag-
gregate bank balance sheets need to be supple-
mented with more detailed information on bank
lending behavior. One limitation of balance sheet
data is that they contain no information on the rates
banks charge on new loans or on other terms of loan
contracts.  In addition, the value of loans on banks’
balance sheets may change for a variety of reasons
having little to do with monetary policy. For exam-
ple, while loans on balance sheets could decline as
a consequence of restrictive monetary policy, they
could also fall as a result of increases in nonper-
forming loans or because banks sell loans to other
financial institutions.  
Information on the terms of bank lending may
also be useful in distinguishing between the “lending
view” and the “credit rationing” explanations of a
bank credit channel. In particular, Kashyap and
Stein note that the lending view is a statement about
the relative magnitude of shifts in the demand for
and supply of loans when policy is tightened. Ac-
cording to the lending view, the volume of new
loans should decline and loan rates should rise
relative to market rates when policy is tightened.
This behavior would indicate loan supply shifts are
relatively larger than loan demand shifts.  In con-
trast, most theories of credit rationing suggest that,
while the volume of new loans should decline when
policy is tightened, bank loan rates should actually
increase less than market rates.
Recent studies on bank lending using survey
data on the terms of lending have found little evidence






Note: Core deposits are transactions deposits plus small savings deposits deflated by the consumer price index excluding food
and energy.






66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYin favor of either credit rationing or the lending
view. For example, in work specifically designed to
investigate credit rationing, Berger and Udell find
little supporting evidence. While they do find a key
element of rationing, a sluggish response of bank
loan rates to market rates, other characteristics of
rationing are not present. In particular, Berger and
Udell note that interest rates on loans made under
commitment are as sluggish as rates on uncommit-
ted loans. Since loans made under commitment are
presumably not subject to credit rationing, this sug-
gests the slow response of loan rates is not due to
rationing. In addition, they find that the volume of
new bank loans, both uncommitted and committed,
rises in periods of tight credit, while credit rationing
would imply a reduction in loans made without a
commitment. While Berger and Udell do not di-
rectly examine the lending view, the stickiness of
bank loan rates found in their study suggests banks
do not reduce the supply of new loans when mone-
tary policy is tightened.
DOES MONETARY POLICY CONSTRAIN
BANK LENDING?
While recent research provides support for the
view that some borrowers may be dependent on bank
credit, the evidence is conflicting on whether restric-
tive monetary policy actually forces banks to reduce
their lending. One important limitation of previous
research on the reaction of bank lending to restrictive






Note: Securities deflated by the consumer price index excluding food and energy.






ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 67monetary policy is the lack of a direct measure of
monetary policy actions. Using a new measure of
the timing of policy actions, a reexamination of
bank behavior suggests that bank business lending
is not constrained by restrictive monetary policy.
Measuring monetary policy   
Previous research on the credit channel has
used two types of monetary policy measures. Most
studies use a short-term market interest rate, such as
the federal funds rate or Treasury bill rate, to mea-
sure policy actions. Some also use a record of dates
of significant monetary policy actions developed by
Romer and Romer (1989). Both approaches have a
number of limitations (Cecchetti).
One difficulty with the use of short-term market
interest rates to measure policy actions is that large
changes in interest rates can occur for reasons other
than a change in monetary policy. Thus, the re-
sponse of bank lending to interest rate changes
found in some studies may not be caused by mone-
tary policy. Similarly, the failure to find a response
of lending to interest rate changes may be due to
factors other than monetary policy.
A second difficulty with the use of market
interest rates is that these rates may incorporate both
the effects of normal policy actions and special
policy actions. For example, the Federal Reserve






Note: Managed liabilities are small and large time deposits, Eurodollar deposits, and repurchase agreements deflated by the
consumer price index excluding food and energy.
Source: Authors’ calculations are from the H.6 release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.





68 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYimposed direct credit controls on banks and raised
interest rates in the second quarter of 1980. During
this period, it is difficult to untangle the effect of
changes in interest rates on bank lending from the
effect of the credit controls.
4
The use of the Romer and Romer dating proce-
dure to measure policy actions also has problems.
Romer and Romer have chosen to measure only
significant anti-inflationary actions taken by the
Federal Reserve. Post-1975, there are only three
Romer dates and most of the studies cited above
incorporate only the two dates reported in 1978 and
1979. Thus, use of these dates to measure policy
actions omits considerable information about
monetary policy. The Romer dates have also been
criticized as reflecting factors other than monetary
policy actions, such as oil price shocks, and for their
accuracy in identifying significant policy actions
(Hoover and Perez; Dotsey and Reid; Sellon).
To attempt to overcome some of these difficul-
ties, this article uses a new measure of monetary
policy actions to identify periods in which the Fed-
eral Reserve was tightening monetary policy (Sel-
lon). This measure, termed the “effective funds
target,” includes all changes in the Federal Re-
serve’s short-run operating targets from September
1974 to the present (Chart 3). With this measure of
policy actions it is possible to isolate four separate
periods since the mid-1970s in which the Federal
Reserve pursued a sustained policy of reducing






Note:  he spread is the difference between the bank loan rate and the 3-month commercial paper rate.  The bank loan rate is
the weighted average stated rate on new demand loans and loans with a maturity between one month and one year. Demand
loans are loans with no stated maturity.
Source: Authors’ calculations are from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve





ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 69bank reserves to raise the federal funds rate and in
which there were no special policy actions imple-
mented through reserve requirement changes or
direct credit controls. The four periods, identified
by shaded areas in Chart 3, are: January 1977 to
September 1979, April 1983 to August 1984, April
1988 to May 1989, and February 1994 to February
1995.
5 For each episode, the beginning of the
shaded area identifies the month before tightening
began. The ending of the shaded area identifies the
last month before policy was eased. Thus, within
each “policy window” the Federal Reserve was
taking a series of restrictive policy actions designed
to slow the pace of economic activity and reduce
inflationary pressures.
6 
Bank lending during policy tightening 
These “policy windows” provide a more precise
way of viewing bank lending behavior during peri-
ods of policy tightening. Looking first at balance
sheet data, the behavior of bank business lending
during each tightening period is shown in Chart 4.
In each period, real commercial and industrial
(C&I) lending rises throughout the period and
shows no tendency to weaken until well after the
Federal Reserve has reversed course and has begun
to ease policy. In addition, it is clear that in each
episode, business lending tends to lag economic
activity as measured by industrial production. That
is, the peak in lending occurs a few months after the






Note: The ratio of nominal loans that are not made under a commitment to nominal GDP, where loans are measured as the
sum of demand loans and loans with a maturity between one month and one year not under commitment. Demand loans are
loans with no stated maturity.
Source: Authors’ calculations are from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve






70 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpeak in industrial activity. 
 Taken together, these results lend little support
to the view that restrictive monetary policy con-
strains business lending. Indeed, the results are
more in line with the view that business lending is
driven by the demand for loans rather than supply.
For example, the strength in business lending after
the decline in industrial production may be caused
by an increased demand for loans to finance an
unanticipated rise in unsold inventories. If so, banks
would appear to be providing an additional source
of liquidity rather than restricting liquidity.
Other aspects of bank portfolio behavior are
consistent with previous research. For example,
core deposits decline in each episode of policy
tightening as interest rates increase (Chart 5).
7
Banks also tend to sell off security holdings and
increase their use of managed liabilities when pol-
icy is tightened (Chart 6, Chart 7).
8 Thus, while
banks are faced with a decline in core deposits when
policy is tightened, they appear to be able to offset
the loss of deposits by selling securities and obtain-
ing additional funding in order to continue to meet
loan demand.
A similar picture of bank behavior emerges
from a more detailed look at the terms of bank
lending during the four episodes of monetary policy
tightening. Indeed, an analysis of information
from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of the Terms of
Bank Lending (STBL) provides little evidence of






Note: Collateral requirements are measured by the percentage of the amount of nominal loans backed by collateral, where loans
are measured by the sum of demand loans and loans with a maturity between one month and one year backed by collateral. 
Demand loans are loans with no stated maturity.
Source: Authors’ calculations are from the Survey of Terms of Bank Lending, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.





ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 71constraints on bank lending during periods of tight-
ening.
9  As noted by Berger and Udell, interest rates
on new loans in the STBL data tend to adjust only
slowly to market rates during a period of tightening.
Thus, as shown in Chart 8, the spread of bank loan
rates over the commercial paper rate actually declines
in each episode of tightening rather than increasing
as required by the lending view.
10 While the sticki-
ness of loan rates is not consistent with the lending
view, it may reflect credit rationing.  However, a
more detailed analysis of the volume of new lending
and the nonprice terms of lending provides little
support for the view that restrictive policy con-
strains bank credit. 
According to both the lending view and credit
rationing, new loans should decline when policy is
tightened. As discussed earlier, this effect is most
likely to be found in uncommitted loans since loans
made under commitment are presumably not subject
to restrictions. Chart 9 shows the ratio of uncommitted
loans to nominal GDP over the 1977-94 period.
Uncommitted loans are deflated by nominal GDP
as a rough method of controlling for business cycle
induced changes in loan demand. This ratio shows
little change during the 1977-79 and 1994 tightening
episodes. In contrast, it declines during the 1983-84
and 1988-89 episodes, suggesting that lending may
have been constrained in these two periods.
 A more detailed analysis of these two periods,
however, indicates the decline in lending may not
have been caused by monetary tightening. Because
both episodes occur in the middle of a long down-
ward trend in the number of uncommitted loans, it
is important to remove this trend when examining
the effect of policy tightening on lending.
11 After
detrending, the ratio of uncommitted loans to GDP
in the 1983-84 and 1988-89 periods tends to de-
cline, but the declines are not statistically signifi-
cant.
12 Thus, the decline in the ratio of uncommitted
loans to GDP in the 1983-84 and 1988-89 periods
is apparently due more to long-run factors affecting
this ratio rather than to a cyclical tightening of
monetary policy. 
Another indication of possible credit rationing
by banks is an increase in the nonprice terms of
lending such as collateral requirements. Chart 10
shows how collateral requirements on new business
loans changed over the 1977-94 period.
13 Casual
observation suggests that banks may have increased
collateral requirements in the 1977-79, 1983-84,
and 1988-89 periods, consistent with credit ration-
ing. As in the case of uncommitted loans, however,
there is a strong trend in collateral requirements that
may have nothing to do with monetary policy.
14 
 When the long-run trend is removed, it appears
collateral requirements rose during the 1983-84 and
1988-89 tightening episodes and may have declined
in the most recent 1994 period. None of these effects
is statistically significant, though, suggesting col-
lateral requirements on business loans are not raised
in response to a tightening of monetary policy.
15
Taken as a whole, this reexamination of balance
sheet and survey information finds little support for
either the lending view or credit rationing. Indeed,
there is no evidence bank business lending is con-
strained by restrictive monetary policy in any of the
four episodes of monetary tightening examined in
this article. Thus, in spite of other information sug-
gesting some borrowers are dependent on bank
credit, there is little indication monetary policy
works through a separate credit channel.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Ongoing changes in the banking industry have
brought renewed attention to the role banks play in
the monetary transmission mechanism. To the ex-
tent certain borrowers are dependent on bank credit
and bank lending is constrained by monetary policy,
restrictive policy may affect the economy through
a bank credit channel. Structural changes in the role
banks play in the financial system may then affect
monetary policy by altering this credit channel.
The analysis presented in this article finds little
evidence that bank lending is constrained by mone-
tary policy. In four periods of restrictive monetary
policy over the past 20 years, banks have been able
72 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYto offset a decline in core deposits by selling secu-
rities and issuing managed liabilities so as to main-
tain their business lending. In addition, an analysis
of the terms of bank business lending finds little
support for the view banks reduce loan supply or
ration credit in periods of monetary tightening. 
Because a direct bank credit channel does not
appear to be part of the monetary transmission
mechanism, concern that structural changes in the
banking system may affect the transmission mecha-
nism does not appear to be warranted. At the same
time, it is important to recognize that the evidence
presented in this article does not imply that bank
credit is unimportant. Indeed, to the extent that
some borrowers are dependent on bank credit, sud-
den disruptions in bank lending could alter their
spending decisions and affect the level of economic
activity.
ENDNOTES
1 See Mayer, pp. 125-46, for a detailed discussion on the
“availability doctrine.”
2 An additional implication of the declining importance of
bank lending concerns the use of credit market indicators as
guides to future economic activity. To the extent that bank
lending or credit growth is tied closely to business spending
decisions, it may provide important information about current
or future economic activity. If large firms have developed
alternatives to bank lending, however, measures of bank
credit flows to these firms may provide an inaccurate gauge
of future spending. Thus, if the ability of firms to substitute
other methods of financing for bank loans has changed over
time, measures of bank credit may have become less reliable
as barometers of future economic activity.
3 See Hubbard for references to this literature.
4 Another problem is that some discussions of a credit channel
contain an implicit assumption that monetary policy has
asymmetrical effects on lending. That is, while restrictive
policy may curtail lending, there is no presumption that easier
policy causes an acceleration in lending. Yet, use of a market
interest rate without an attempt to distinguish periods of
tightening and easing implies a symmetrical effect of policy
actions that may lead to biased estimates of the effect of policy
actions on bank lending. 
5 These periods were generally selected to include the month
in which the first of a sustained set of increases in reserve
pressure occurred and to end in the month before the Federal
Reserve began to ease policy. The first period is somewhat
different, however, in that it includes only the tightening up
to the October 1979 change in Federal Reserve operating
procedures. While the Federal Reserve continued to tighten
policy after September 1979, monetary policy was
implemented under a different set of operating procedures,
changes in market interest rates were unusually large, and
policy actions were supplemented in both October 1979 and
March 1980 with additional measures such as reserve
requirement changes and credit controls. Thus, after
September 1979, it becomes difficult to separate ordinary
policy changes from these special actions. In addition, the
late-1980s period omits the tightening that occurred in 1987
as well as the easing of policy that happened after the October
1987 stock market crash as, again, representing unusual
factors in financial markets. Finally, the 1994 period ends
with currently available data in February 1995 and does not
represent a complete policy cycle.
6 In the 1977-79 period, this policy measure includes 22
actions taken by the Federal Reserve to restrict reserve
availability and put upward pressure on the federal funds rate.
Over this period, the effective funds target increased from 4
5/8 to 11 1/2 percent. In the 1983-84 period, there were five
actions that increased the effective funds target from 8 1/2 to
11 percent. In 1988-89, there were ten actions increasing the
effective funds target from 6 1/2 to 9 3/4 percent. In 1994-95,
so far there have been seven actions raising the effective funds
target from 3 to 6 percent.
7 Core deposits are defined in this article as transactions
accounts plus savings deposits. The decline in core deposits
in the 1983-84 period is less pronounced because of the
introduction of money market deposit accounts in early 1983,
a factor that boosted bank core deposits. Similarly, the decline
in security holdings during this period, shown in Chart 6, is
less pronounced because banks temporarily invested the
increased flow of deposits in securities.
8 Managed liabilities in this article are defined as small and
large time deposits, repurchase agreements, and Eurodollar
borrowings.
9 The Survey of Terms of Bank Lending is a quarterly survey
of approximately 350 banks taken during the first full business
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1995 73week in the second month of each quarter. Respondent banks
report the amount and terms, such as the interest rate, maturity,
whether the loan is backed by collateral, and whether the loan
is made under a commitment, for all new commercial and
industrial loans made during the survey week. The data are
adjusted so that they reflect the terms of lending by all
commercial banks. The data are currently available from
February 1977 to November 1994, and aggregated data are
reported in the Federal Reserve’s E.2 release. This article only
uses demand loans, which are loans with no stated maturity,
and loans with a maturity between one month and one year.
Together, these represent about 40 percent of total business
lending. Loans that mature in less than a month are excluded
because they typically are not the type of loans that are
relevant for a credit channel. Specifically, such loans appear
to be used primarily for cash management purposes and to
finance short-term security purchases rather than for financing
inventories and short-term capital investment. Loans with
maturities greater than a year are excluded because they also
are not typically used for financing inventories and short-term
capital investment.
10 The spread of bank loan rates over market rates is the
weighted average stated rate on new demand loans and loans
with a maturity between one month and one year less the
three-month commercial paper rate.
11 Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for the
null hypothesis that the log of the ratio of loans not under
commitment to GDP has a unit root cannot be rejected at
conventional levels of significance. The loan-to-GDP ratio
was detrended by taking the difference between the log of
its value and its trend, where the trend was calculated by
applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter (l equal to 1600) to the
log of the loan-to-GDP ratio. Detrending the data with  l
equal to 1200, 800, 400, and 200 does not change any of the
conclusions reached in the empirical analysis. A value of 1600
was chosen because that is the value recommended by
Hodrick and Prescott and most commonly used for quarterly
data. Because the detrended value is the difference between
the logs of the actual and trend values, it is approximately
equal to the percentage deviation of the loan-to-GDP ratio
from its trend.
12 Specifically, the average change in the detrended ratio of
uncommitted loans to GDP is not statistically different from
zero during tightening episodes.
13 Collateral requirements are measured as the percentage of
the amount of nominal loans backed by collateral.
14 Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for the
null hypothesis that the percent of loans backed by collateral
has a unit root cannot be rejected at conventional levels of
significance. The percent of loans backed by collateral was
detrended by taking its difference from its trend, where the
trend was calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (l
equal to 1600). Detrending the data with l equal to 1200, 800,
400, and 200 does not change any of the conclusions reached
in the empirical analysis. A value of 1600 was chosen because
that is the value recommended by Hodrick and Prescott and
most commonly used for quarterly data.
15 Specifically, the average change in the detrended
percentage of collateralized loans is not statistically different
from zero during tightening episodes.
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